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An Introduction
"[N]o one wiU understand me to be speaking with disspect[,] ... [for] one
may criticise even what one revs."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.*
The curious document that begins on the next page requires some
explanatory introduction. My invitation to participate in a panel on
the federal appeals process at the Symposium on Civil Litigation Re-
form in the Twenty-first Century gave me serious pause. I was pleased
and honored to be included on a panel with Judge Thomas M. Reavley
and Professor William M. Richman, of course, but I despaired of saying
anything that has not already been said before many times and in
many ways, either by me or by my distinguished fellow panelists.
Therefore, I sought redemption in technology. I began "surfing the
Internet," looking for interesting and current data on the United States
Courts of Appeals. Inexplicably, my PC screen went blank, and the logo
"Netscape-2020" suddenly appeared. Somehow, someway, I was brows-
ing the future. Among other documents, I downloaded a copy of the
Chief Justice's Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary for the year
2020. Just about then the screen went blank again. Never before or
since has anything like this ever happened, and our computer guru
could offer no explanation for this mysterious time-surge. The
Pepperdine Law Review agreed that this document should be published
as part of the 1997 Symposium without any changes or annotations.
Thus, the future will speak for itself Tempis Fugit.
-Thomas E. Baker"
* Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 473
(1897).
** Alvin R. Allison Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; Lubbock, Tex-
as; tbaker@ttu.edu. B.S. 1974, Florida State University; J.D. 1977, University of Florida
Professor Baker's latest book is THE MOST WONDERFUL WORK-OUR CONSTrUTION INTER-
PPRF_,D (1996).
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I. A FoND FAREWELL
This is my twentieth and final Year-End Report on the Judiciary. I have
notified the President this day that I will retire as Chief Justice of the
United States at the end of this October Term 2020, effective July 1,
2021, or when my successor is confirmed.
Upon his own retirement, Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke of the awe-
some responsibility undertaken by those who are called on to speak the
last word under the Constitution:
It is a responsibility that is made more difficult in this Court because we have no
constituency. We serve no majority. We serve no minority. We serve only the
public interest as we see it, guided only by the Constitution and our own con-
sciences. And conscience sometimes is a very severe taskmaster.'
During my tenure, I have tried in good conscience to judge by this creed,
and that is how I hope to be judged.
On this occasion, it is altogether fitting and proper to begin with a
solicitous note of gratitude to my good colleagues on the Supreme Court,
for whom I have the highest personal regard and the deepest respect and
admiration. While we have not always agreed in all of our decisions, all
of us have strived to disagree agreeably, at least most of us, most of the
time, though admittedly not all of us, and not all of the time. That re-
minds me to offer our heartfelt best wishes to Justice Antonin Scalia on
his eighty-sixth birthday and his thirty-sixth anniversary of being appoint-
ed to the Supreme Court. Next year he will become the Justice with the
longest service in our history. And I say without fear of contradiction
that the "Energizer Dissenter," as he is affectionately known, will go on
and on, beating his drum for many Terms to come.'
Writ of Reinhardt: While on the subject of the Supreme Court, I
should take the time to express our appreciation to Congress for adding
to the All Writs Statute3 the new explicit authorization to issue a Writ of
Reinhardt. This new writ takes the form of an Order by the Court which
designates a list of circuit judges by name so that every decision or opin-
1. Retirement of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 89 S. Ct. 17 (1969) (Order).
2. "Acknowledging his frustration in a humorous vein, Justice Scalia periodically
asks his own clerks: 'What's a smart guy like me doing in a place like this?'" Paul M.
Barrett, The Loner Despite Expectations, Scalia Fails to Unify Conservatives on
Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1992, at Al; see also Cult of Scalia (visited Apr. 7, 1997)
<http://pflotmsu.edu/user/schwenkVscaliahtm>; The Scalia Shrine (visited May 8, 1997)
<http://johnh.wheaton.edu/-jonmitch/scaliahtml>.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
ion written by a listed judge is automatically vacated and remanded for
further consideration.4 This writ is the most significant increase in our
discretionary power over our Court's docket in more than thirty years.5
We deem it appropriate to require the agreement of five Justices (one
more than the four votes needed to grant review of a case)8 so that only
a majority may add or remove a circuit judge's name from the Order
list:
II. THE FIRST Two DECADES OF THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY
In the fullness of time, we should stop and reflect upon where we
have been and where we are8 and where we are going, upon the politics
of meaning or, perhaps, the politics of politics and the meaning of mean-
ing.' Let us pause to contemplate all that has happened in the United
States of America, during my time in the center chair, looking back on
the decades of the 00s and the 10s.'°
Demographics: The population has increased by thirty million and,
because the basic workload of the courts is greatly a function of the
population, the judicial workload has grown apace. Furthermore, the
dockets of the courts continue to reflect changes in the population. As
the baby-boomer generation grew older and reached retirement, more
and more cases raising issues related to the elderly were pressed on the
courts. More cases presented issues related to pensions and health care,
4. See David M. O'Brien, Reinhardt and the Supreme Court. This Time, It's Per-
sonal, LA. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at M2.
5. See Robert L Stem et al., Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1,
1988, at 66.
6. See John Paul Stevens, The Life-Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L REv. 1
(1983).
7. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 n.8 (1973) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (citing to more than thirty cases that were "Redrup-ed" and reversed by one-
citation per curiam opinions).
8. Reader. YOU ARE HERE*.
9. MICHAEL LERNER, THE POLITCS OF MEANING: RESTORING HOPE AND POSSIBILITY IN
AN AGE OF CYNICISM (1996).
10. This portion of the Year-End Report is adapted from Thomas E. Baker, A View
to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor in Deep," 45 CASE W. RES.
L REv. 705, 709-15 (1995). The discussion draws on the predictions of two studies of
the future of the judicial system. HUDSON INSTITrTE, TRENDS AFFECTING THE FEDERAL
CouaRrs (Oct. 1989) (commissioned by the Federal Courts Study Committee); Franklin
M. Zweig et al., Securing the Future for America's State Courts, 73 JUDICATURE 296
(1990) (Georgetown University's "Delphi Study"); see also Lars Fuller & Craig
Boersema, Judging the Future: How Social Trends Will Affect the Courts, 69 DENV. U.
L REv. 201 (1992); Panel Discussion, The Changing Face of America-How Will Demo-
graphic Trends Affect the Courts?, 72 JuDICATuRE 125 (1988). Those futurists were
remarkably prescient.
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for example. In the aftermath of the Social Security Crisis of 2011, un-
precedented class action lawsuits of biblical proportions were filed in
every district court in the country. Once so-called "death and dying is-
sues" became to be understood as federal and constitutional issues, an
entirely new category of federal litigation presented itself to federal
courts."
Civil Docket Growth: Differences in birthrates and immigration pat-
terns among racial groups have resulted in proportional increases in the
percentages of nonwhite ethnic and racial groups. Consonant with our
previous national experience, these new groups of "hyphenated-Ameri-
cans" repaired to the courts to work out their differences with the larger
society, in civil rights suits and workplace litigation over discrimination
in business practices and employment patterns. The transition from a
smokestack economy to a silicon chip society had huge unsettling effects
on businesses and workers, with a consequent increase in litigation.
Likewise, the social transformation of the institution of the family and
the related reforms of federal and state public assistance programs
meant more cases for courts. The back-and-forth pendulum swings in the
federal policies on government entitlements during the last twenty years
also generated more disputes over programmatic phase-outs and individ-
ual benefits terminations.
"E Pluribus Pluribus" thus seems to be the motto of the United States
courts. 2 With the benefit of hindsight, we can appreciate how political,
social, and economic factors have grown the civil caseload in four prima-
ry ways. First, judicial4 and political"s decisions extended the civil
rights and antidiscrimination policies of the federal government to cover
11. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. grunted, 117 S. Ct 36 (1996);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nori.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). "When a liberal says something is like
abortion, we know that something, whatever it is, is protected by the Constitution."
ROBERr H. BoR, SLOUCHNG TOWARDS GOMORRAH 111 (1996).
12. Al Kamen, For Gore, It's AU in the Translation, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1994, at
A13 (quoting Vice President Gore to observe that America's "ethnic melting pot" dem-
onstrates the national motto, "e pluribus unum-out of one, many.")
13. See Baker, supra note 10, at 713-14.
14. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
15. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)); Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, Pub. L No. 90-202, 82 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994)).
newly defined groups with more and more individual members. Second,
the expansion of mass tort litigation involving health and environmental
matters presented complex and difficult issues of causation and risk
allocation in a larger context of more and more elaborate federal admin-
istrative regulations."8 Third, these mass tort cases and related develop-
ments imposed a disproportionate burden on the federal courts, taxing
their capacity for evolving the law to keep up with scientific and techno-
logical advances. 7 Fourth, late twentieth century deconstructive tenden-
cies to de-mythologize the professions of medicine and law spread to
countenance the extension of malpractice theory to allow actions in the
areas of education, religion, and government, including the paradox of
bringing lawsuits to claim judicial malpractice. Finally, litigiousness in-
creased generally between the years 2000 and 2020, as it seemed that the
old-fashioned cich6 "Don't make a federal case out of it!" was turned
around to make a federal case out of everything.18
Criminal Docket Growth: The criminal caseload increased during the
first two decades of this century simply as a factor of population in-
crease over the same period. However, the legislative tendency towards
criminalization of more and more behaviors and the proclivity of prose-
cutors in the executive branch to prosecute more offenders have exacer-
bated the strains on the district courts. New categories of crimes, un-
known in the 1990s, have been added to the federal criminal code to
regulate the cyberspace economy. Indeed, congressional lawmakers have
been ingenious in extending the scope of federal crimes to police the
globalized economy under the Commerce Clause. But the forty-year "War
on Drugs" has contributed the most to the crowded dockets of the dis-
trict courts, with no end in sight. Indeed, my worry, quite frankly, is that
the court system has been the unintended casualty of this war. Relatedly,
prisoners' rights litigation has increased exponentially with the levels of
magnitude increases in the numbers of prisoners in state and federal
prisons. Lawsuits against prison officials brought under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act have increased dramatically every year since it
was enacted in 1993."9 And the more prisoners we have in custody, the
16. AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS (1994); Donald T. Trautman, Some Thoughts on Choice of Law, Judicial Dis-
cretion, and the ALI's Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L REV. 835 (1994).
17. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHAI
LENGES (1993).
18. But c. Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Jus-
tice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633 (1994); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anec-
dote, 55 MD. L REV. 1093 (1996).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994); see Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
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more petitions for habeas corpus will be filed, no matter how Congress
tries to restrain them.'
Federalization: The most important development for the federal
court workload since the turn of the century has been the accelerating
and expanding "federalization" of the law in the United States.2' Con-
gress has greatly extended the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts, in effect, by authorizing civil claims and criminal prosecutions in
area after area that would have been considered the domain of the states
three decades ago. Back in the 1990s, no one could have foreseen the
nationalizing effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.' The judicial mind reels look-
ing back at the proliferation of such treaties and agreements since then.
Mention already has been made of the federalization of the criminal law,
which began to accelerate after the passage of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 3 This trend has accelerated ever
since, with only the occasional and brief pause.2'
Looking back, we can identify two paradigm-shifting statutes in the
long-rn, run-away federalization: congressional enactment of a compre-
hensive national health care program in 20092 and the Federal Products
Liability Act of 2011.' Today, there are forty billion administrative
claims filed each year under the health care program; approximately ten
percent, or four million, are denied and contested, and an estimated one
out of forty of these disputes survives the administrative process and
ends up in the court system.' This total number of additional federal
cases is nearly matched by the products liability suits brought under the
2011 statute.' These two federal statutes by themselves have added
more than 80,000 cases each year to the dockets of the federal courts.
These two examples have been compounded by a myriad of other laws
that have federalized area after area of public policy once deemed within
the domain of the states and state courts.
20. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
21. WnLiAm W. ScHwARzER & RussELL R WHEELER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE
ADmINmrAiON OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSICE (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1994).
22. Baker, supra note 10, at 74548.
23. Id. at 748-54.
24. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
25. Baker, supra note 10, at 755-59.
26. Id. at 759-60.
27. These are "conservative estimate[s]." Id. at 757.
28. Id. at 760.
The Third Branch always has and always will depend on "the kindness
of strangers,"I2 strangers in the legislative branch, because the Constitu-
tion gives to Congress the plenary power to "ordain and establish" the
"inferior courts" of the United States and then to order their jurisdic-
tion.' But Congress must not practice deficit jurisdiction. The number
of judges and the resources of the judicial branch must remain equal to
the demands on the court system. For it is through our courts that our
nation pursues its preanbulatory purpose to "establish justice."3
Judicial Independence: I cannot emphasize enough how "[t]he insti-
tutional independence of the federal judiciary is critical to our nation's
political system.' 3 The Constitution's impeachment and removal provi-
sions provide an eighteenth century cannon which may be deployed at
the will of the legislative branch.' But the Framers contemplated that
Congress would proceed in wisdom and with restraint. As the titular
leader of the Third Branch, I must register my grave reservations about
the impeachment proceedings currently being conducted against Circuit
Judge Dennis Rodman of the Court of Appeals for Chicago.3' Congress
must honor the separation of powers to distinguish between on-court
and off-court judicial behavior. Discipline procedures short of impeach-
ment and removal have been an effective part of our federal judicial
system for some forty years.' Those procedures should be permitted to
run their course within the judicial branch before Congress resorts to its
constitutional powers.
29. "Whoever you are-I have always depended on the dndness of strangers." TEN-
NESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE act 3, sc. 11 (1947) (quoting character of
Blanche DuBois).
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
31. U.S. CONST. preamble; see Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish
Justice?, 101 HARV. L REv. 1026 (1988).
32. THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIE CENTURY TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1989). See generally Federal Judicial
Independence Symposium, 46 MERCER L REv. 637 (1995).
33. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). See generally ELEANORE
BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFOmRUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIAS (1992);
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS-A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HIS-
TORiCAL ANALYSIS (1996); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IM-
PEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); MARY L
VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT. NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE (1993).
34. DENNIS RODMAN, BAD AS I WANNA BE (1996).
35. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,
Pub. L No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 372
(1994)).
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El. THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAFS
In keeping with past Year-End Reports on the Judiciary, I want to
highlight one part of the Third Branch, even though we all understand
that all our courts, state and federal, articulate as "ONE WHOLE" sys-
tem.' This year, my focus is on the United States Courts of Appeals and
their problems.'
Study After Study: Nearly thirty years ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist
urged, "One of the chief needs of our generation is to deal with the cur-
rent appellate capacity crisis in the federal courts of appeals."' s His
alarm was sounded amidst a Greek chorus of tragedian studies, which
started more than fifty years ago and which have continued to the pres-
ent day."
1968: An American Bar Foundation report recommended a sequential
strategy for dealing with federal appellate growth in the long run.'
1972: A Federal Judicial Center committee, known as the Freund Com-
mittee, made recommendations to the Supreme Court and Congress to
create a new level of appellate court."
1972 & 1975: The congressionally created Hruska Commission issued
two reports, three years apart: the first report recommended dividing
of the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits; the second report recommended
creating a new level of appellate court 42
36. THE FEDERAIST No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37. The futuristic statistics and predictions offered here are not as terribly out-
landish as they might first appear. They merely take the next logical steps toward
greater federal appellate court efficiencies. Consider what one circuit judge foresaw
when he gazed into the crystal ball thirty years ago: "So my vision of the future would
include a presumption against oral argument and a presumption against published
precedential opinions, but a requirement for some form of written opinion in every
case." John J. Gibbons, Maintaining Effective Procedures in the Federal Appellate
Court, reprinted in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22, 27
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., Fed Jud. Ctr. 1989).
38. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice Addresses Federal Court Workload, Future
Needs, THE THIRD BRANCH, June 1992, at 4 (Admin. Office of U.S. Courts).
39. "[Tlhe fundamental transformation of the federal appellate process is an issue
that has been studied to death." William L Reynolds & William 1X Richman, Studying
Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L REV. 1290, 1303-04 (1996).
40. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968).
41. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972).
42. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
1975: The Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, in liaison with the
Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts, pro-
posed guidelines for a complete restructuring of the federal appellate
system.
43
1977: The Department of Justice Committee on Revision of the Federal
Judicial Center made many recommendations for improving the federal
courts.44
1978: The American Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce
Court Costs and Delay recommended intramural reforms in federal
appellate procedures.'
1986: The NYU Project focused on the Supreme Court and proposed a
"managerial model" for improving the functioning of the federal ap-
pellate system.
1989: The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal
Judicial Improvements reviewed and repeated the concerns of previous
studies and concluded that "reform of the courts of appeals will not be
a question of whether, but a question of when."
47
1990: The congressionally created Federal Courts Study Committee
concluded that the Courts of Appeals faced a "crisis of volume" that
was predicted to continue to worsen and eventually require some "fun-
damental change."'
1993: The Federal Judicial Center reported to Congress that intramural
reforms eventually would prove inadequate and, if the national policy
choice is to maintain the existing federal appellate structure, in order
to restore traditional appellate procedures in all appeals or in all ap-
Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975); Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of
the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.RD. 223 (1973)
[hereinafter Geographical Boundaries].
43. See Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Iflation, Malfunction, and a Pro-
posed Course of Action, 1981 BYU L REv. 617, 628-29.
44. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977).
45. Seth Hufstedler & Paul Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litiga-
tion Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A. J. 965 (1980).
46. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A
THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986); see also Thomas E. Baker,
Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L REv. 1472 (1989) (critical book
review).
47. REPORT OF THE A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS,
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFrER A
CENTURY OF GROWTH 40 (1989).
48. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIrrEE 109 (Apr. 2, 1990).
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peals decided on the merits, there must be substantially fewer appeals
or some massive increase in the number of judges and support person-
nel.'
1993: The Federal Judicial Center published a Report on the debate
whether to increase the number of federal judges dramatically to meet
caseload demands or whether to declare a moratorium on new judge-
ships.'
1994: The Federal Judicial Center issued its study of the worrisome im-
plications for the federal courts resulting from the federalization of the
law in the United States.5'
1994: Professor Thomas E. Baker published his now classic work on
the courts of appeals in order to draw attention to their problems.'I
1995: The Judicial Conference of the United States approved a Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts which recommended "circuit re-
structuring... if compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudi-
cative or administrative dysfunction." '
1999: The American Law Institute completed its comprehensive review
of the jurisdictional and procedural provisions in the United States
Code."M
49. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COUIRS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 156 (1993).
50. GORDON BEIRMANT ET AL, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT AND IMPLCATIONS (Fed Jud. Ctr. 1993).
51. SCHwAzER & WHEELER, supra note 21.
52. THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUS7ICE ON APPEAL THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS (1994). See generally Edith IL Jones, Back to the %uture for Fed-
eral Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73
TEX L REV. 1485 (1995); Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study
of the United States Courts of Appeals, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1505 (1995); Joseph F. Weis,
Jr., The Case for Appellate Court Revision, 93 MICH. L REV. 1266 (1995). "If we are
facing failure in our assignment, corrections by Congress and the judges are at hand
that should silence the alarm bells." Thomas M. Reavley, A Review of Rationing Jus-
tice On AppeaL: The Problems of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 26 TEx TECH L. REV. 271,
271 (1995) (book review).
53. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS, Recommendation No. 17, at 44 (Dec. 1995). See generally Robb M. Jones, The
Pature of the Federal Courts, JUDGES J., Fail 1995, at 17.
54. Baker, supra note 10, at 813-14. See generally American Law Institute, Federal
Judicial Code Revision Project, Preliminary Draft No. 1 (Sept. 9, 1996); American Law
Institute, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, Council Draft No. 1 (Dec. 1, 1996).
2020 Commission on Federal Court Structure: Three years ago,
the Commission on Federal Court Structure, popularly named the Baker
Commission after its distinguished Chairman, began its comprehensive
study of the structure and organization of the federal courts.' The Bak-
er Commission took a decidedly long-range perspective. The Commission
was composed of prominent members of all three branches as well as
distinguished lawyers and professors. This interbranch group relied on
the cumulative expertise of the Administrative Office of the United
States, the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, the
Department of Justice, the Federal Judicial Center, the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, the Judiciary Committees of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives, the State Justice Institute, and the
National Center for State Courts.
Congress charged the Baker Commission to: (1) determine the nature
and extent of the problems with the structure of the courts of appeals;
(2) identify and review proposed extramural or structural reforms; (3)
evaluate the purpose of each proposed reform against the appellate ideal;
(4) assess the projected costs and benefits of each proposed reform in
terms of the federal appellate tradition; (5) measure the expected effect
of each proposed reform of the intermediate court on the district courts
and the Supreme Court; (6) draft alternative legislative plans for reform-
ing the structure of the federal court system; and (7) articulate general
criteria to assess the alternative proposed reforms.'
This past year, the Baker Commission delivered a 200-page final report,
entitled COURTS TO CONGRESS: JusT Do IT! 7 Without a doubt, this docu-
ment provides "the bold and imaginative vision that is necessary to bring
about change in an institution as conservative as the federal judiciary."'
I commend this remarkable document to Congress' careful consideration.
Having thus commended this study, my plaintive plea to Congress is this:
The time has come. The time is now.
I say unto Congress. Enact legislation!
I do not care how.'
55. See Thomas E. Baker, A Proposal That Congress Create a Commission on Fed-
eral Court Structure, 14 Miss. L REv. 271 (1994); see also Carl Tobias, The New Cer-
tiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L REv. 1264 (1996).
56. Baker, supra note 55, at 277.
57. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL COURT STRUCTURE, COuRTs TO CONGRESS: JUST Do IT!
(Nike Jud. Ctr. 2020).
58. Reiniardt, supra note 52, at 1505.
59. DR SEUSS, MARviN K MOONEY W.LL YOU PLEASE Go Now! 4 (1972).
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The Baker Commission Report describes the spiraling mega-crisis of
the courts of appeals.' Indeed, the Commission coined the term "mega-
crisis" specifically to describe the orders of magnitude increases and the
prevalent diseconomies of scale which characterize the intermediate
federal appellate courts in 2020.61 Twenty-five years ago, it could be ob-
served that those courts, like little Alice in Through the Looking Glass,
were running as fast as they could to stay in the same place.' Today,
they more resemble George Jetson on his treadmill, caught up in their
own machinery, going round-and-round in an out-of-control panic.
Consider the simple linear progression of circuit judgeships and appel-
late filings at ten-year intervals over the last half-century:'
60. "However people may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that
its appellate courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the
institutions they were even a generation ago." REPor OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
CoMmrrrE, supra note 48, at 109.
61. We do note, however, that there are "crises" and then there are "crises":
"Crisis" is a much overused word. Burgeoning caseloads are nothing new, nor
is the sense that the system is on the verge of breakdown. What is new is
the perception that the traditional remedies-enlarging the number of judge-
ships and amiliary staff, creating new courts, or subdividing existing courts
into smaller units--are no longer adequate.
Arthur D. Helman, Crisis in the Circuits and the Brmoning Years, in RErUcTuiR-
ING JUsTICE-THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS 3, 4 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (footnotes omitted).
62. See Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Cri-
sis of Volume" in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 61 WASH. & LEE L REV. 97, 107 (1994).
63. For the years 1950-1990, these figures are taken from Admin. of the Fed. Judi-
ciary: Hearings Before the Subconm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Charles
Clark). See Baker & Hauptly, supra note 62, at 108 n.47. For the years 2000 & 2010,
these figures are the highest estimates taken from Memorandum by Steven C. Suddaby,
Statistician, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Denis J. Hauptly, Re-
porter, Subcommittee on Administration, Management, and Structure of the Federal
Courts Study Committee (July 20, 1989), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-
MfTTEE WORMNG PAPERS AND SuBcomMrEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990). For the year 2020,
the figures simply were made up to look really bad, thus illustrating that "[t]here are
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN'S AUTO-
BIOGRAPHY 246 (1928) (attributing the remark to Benamin Disraeli). Constructing the
alternative futures of the federal courts permits a certain poetic license:
The year is 2020. Congress has continued the federalization trends of the
eighties and nineties, and federal court caseloads have grown at a rapid rate.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the 21st Circuit, Lower Tier, a
recently appointed federal judge arrives at her chambers, planning to consult
the latest electronic advance sheets in Fed 7th in order to determine the
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
97 132 156 577 1384 2000
11,662 23,200 40,898 93,477 221,644 400,000
Currently, the courts of appeals annually produce published opinions
amounting to two terabytes of the FEDERAL REPORTER CD-ROM SERIES,
the equivalent of 1000 volumes in the old FEDERAL REPORTER 4TH SE-
RIES. These courts and their judges have innovated to the nth degree
implementing intramural reforms, i.e., adaptations of appellate proce-
dures and case processing techniques. Judge Learned Hand was not de-
scribing this generation of circuit judges when he remarked that federal
judges were "curiously timid about innovations."' They have followed
in the steps of their predecessors, the great judicial innovators of the
1960s and 1970s who saved the courts of appeals from the last great
terror of caseload growth.
The fact is that we can count the total number of appeals once they
are filed, but we cannot adequately explain their multiplier increases.'
Even a slight change in the rate of appeal, Le., the ratio of appealable
district court terminations which are actually appealed to the courts of
appeals, results in huge increases in the appellate dockets. And changes
in the rate of appeals have not been slight. Indeed, by one measure there
was a five-fold increase in the rate of appeals in the last half of the past
century; the ratio went from 1:40 to 1:8.6 If this trend were to extrapo-
late, by the middle of this century the ratio could exceed 1:2. In other
applicable law of her circuit and the upper tier court' of appeals for her
region. With nearly a thousand court of appeals judges writing opinions, fed-
eral law in 2020 has become vaster and more incoherent than ever.
This is only the judge's fourth month on the job, even though she was nomi-
nated by the President three years earlier, the appointment and confirmation
process has bogged down even more than in 1995 because of the numbers of
judicial candidates that the Senate Judiciary Committee must consider every
year. Her predecessor was only on the bench for a year and a half before
resigning in protest because he felt that he was only a small cog in what
had become a vast wheel of justice.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 53, at 17; see also THE FED-
ERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21sT CENTURY (Cynthia Harrison & Russell Wheeler
eds. Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1989).
64. See Thomas E. Baker, Federal Reporter, Third Series: A Call for Opinions "Sitf-
ficient Unto the Case," 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRrING 142, 144 (1994-95).
65. LEARNED HAND, THE CONTRIBUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO CIVILIZATION,
IN THE SPIRIT OF LMERTY 155, 158 (Irving Dillard ed., 1960).
66. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COUR75: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 113-21 (1996).
67. BAxER, supra note 52, at 211.
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words, more than half of district court decisions will be appealed, result-
ing in an increase in filings in the courts of appeals of several orders of
magnitude by the year 2050. We must do what we can to react to these
increases: we must innovate with a vengeance.
Summary Calendar. In 1979, the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure were amended to allow appeals to be decided without oral argu-
ment, if a three-judge panel could agree unanimously.' By the 1990s,
the courts of appeals were deciding about half of their cases without oral
arguments.' That trend has continued until the present While today
more oral arguments are being held than ever before, as an absolute
number, the proportion of appeals afforded an oral argument is down to
about one in ten.
It is time, I submit, to abolish oral argument altogether in that remain-
ing ten percent of appeals. This will reclaim the time and effort circuit
judges are currently devoting to preparing and participating in oral argu-
ments, which represent a substantial systemic savings of judicial resourc-
es. Additionally, the even greater amounts of judge time currently being
devoted to "screening" cases to identify the one-in-ten appeal would be
reclaimed. This reform can and should be accomplished by amending the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."
Relatedly, some courts of appeals have conducted parallel experiments
to abolish written briefs, in a further effort to save judge time. Calls for
less reliance on written presentations go back many years."' The current
pilot programs show much promise. The idea is that lawyers for each
side are permitted to file only a letter not to exceed 1400 words or 9000
characters in lieu of a brief. This mode of limitation can be traced back
to the late 1990s, when the appellate rules were amended to impose type-
volume limitations in terms of words, characters per page, and number
of lines.'
68. FWD. R. App. P. 34(a).
69. BAKER, supra note 52, at 110. See also William M Richman & William L
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorark Requiem for the Learned
Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 279-81 (1996).
70. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22
TEx TECH L REV. 323 (1991); A Se(f-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking, A Report
from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168
F.R.D. 679 (Dec. 1996) (Thomas E. Baker & Frank H. Easterbrook, Subcommittee Mem-
bers).
71. See BAKER, supra note 52, at 117-19, 165-66.
72. See Committee Note to FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7) (Preliminary Draft and Proposed
Decisions Without Opinion: One of the innovations of the old Fifth
Circuit, begun in 1970, was to affirm selective appeals without any writ-
ten opinion." The practice soon was generalized to allow reversals with-
out opinion, as well. The technique spread to other circuits and, over
time, became less and less selective and more and more practiced. Under
current practice, an opinion is written in no more than one-quarter of the
appeals brought nationwide.
Several courts of appeals have taken the next logical step to abolish
written opinions in all appeals pursuant to their local rulemaking pow-
er.7' A beneficial by-product of the abolition of written opinions in those
courts has been to resolve, once and for all, the debate over the propri-
ety of non-publication/non-citation protocols in the local circuit rules,
which permit panels to publish some opinions only to the litigants and
which forbade the citation of the unpublished opinion.' Of even more
significance for the federal court system qua system is that eliminating
opinions will result de facto in the certain elimination of the problem of
conflicts among the circuits.
Today, the decision-without-opinion has become the federal appellate
norm. The written opinion is an outdated judicial ritual that became
obsolete back in the 20th century. It is time to free ourselves from this
formalistic ritual that dates back to before there were computers. It is
time, I submit, to eliminate written appellate opinions altogether and I
urge all the courts of appeals to implement this reform immediately.
Staff Attorneys and Law Clerks: To their great and lasting credit,
the circuit judges have held the line against increasing their decisional
staff.7 They recognize that a 5:1 ratio of law clerks to judges, which is
the national average, is the maximum of delegation and supervision."
They understand that judges must do their own supervising of staff if
they are to deserve the public's respect.TM
Amendments, Apr. 1996).
73. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (6th Cir.
1970); Philip Schuchman & Alkan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Ftfth Cir-
cuit Can Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY LJ. 195 (1980).
74. FED. R. APP. P. 47.
75. BAKER, supra note 52, at 125-35; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 69, at 281-86;
William L Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CH. L REv. 573
(1981); Elizabeth M. Horton, Note, Selective Publication and the Authority of Precedent
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L REV. 1691 (1995).
76. BAKER, supra note 52, at 139-47.
77. Thomas E. Baker, The Institution of Law Clerks in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
3 LONG TERM VIEW 71, 72 (1995).
78. CHARLEs E. WVzAJsu, JR., WHEP, Fs -- A JUDGE'S PREMISEs 61 (1965) (ascribing to
Justice Brandeis the remark, "The reason the pubic thinks so much of the Justices of
the Supreme Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who do their
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Staff attorneys work for the court as a whole rather than for an indi-
vidual judge, in a sense, each one doing the work of three law clerks in
three chambers.' They have become a fixed feature of the modem
court of appeals.' The Judicial Conference of the United States has rec-
ognized that there are limits to the number of staff attorneys that can be
deployed on a central staff."
Law clerks or "elbow clerks" perform valuable work in chambers.
Today, the typical chambers includes four law clerks, and this number
has not increased since the 1990s.' The modem paradigm in chambers
is that circuit judges resemble "senior partners, high government offi-
cials, and professors" who "scrupulously review and edit" the preliminary
work of their junior associates." Nostalgia for the day when a judge re-
searched and wrote each opinion is just nostalgia By one circuit judge's
estimate, a judge without law clerks could research and write about a
dozen or so opinions a year."
Some courts of appeals have experimented with the position of a law
clerk's law clerk-a para-judicial assistant to the judge's law clerk.' To
keep these positions distinct, those courts have renamed law clerks "sub-
judges" and named these assistants "para-judicials." This pyramid ar-
own work."). See generally PosNER, supra note 66, at 140-57.
79. The staff attorney
acquires a case at the moment the notice of appeal is filed, shepherds it
through each procedural step until the closing brief is in, prepares legal
memoranda, drafts a proposed opinion or other disposition, recommends
grant or denial of oral argument, and presents the complete package to the
judges to be graded pass/fail.
Shirley bL Hufstedler, The Appellate Process Inside Out, 50 CAL ST. B.J. 20, 22
(1975).
80. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 69, at 287-92; William M. Richman & William L
Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Sholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 623,
637 (1988); Donald P. Ubell, Evolution and Role of Appellate Court Central Stqff Attor-
neys, 2 COOLEY L REV. 157, 166 (1984).
81. Baker, supra note 77, at 75.
82. Id at 72.
83. Patricia M Wald, The Problems with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L REV. 766, 778 (1983). See generally WLLAM
KOMNARSIU, THE OPINION OF THE COURT 30-31, 44-54 (1996).
84. Wald, supra note 83, at 777.
85. JOHN BILYEAU OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QuAuTES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN AMERICAN
COURTS 27-29 (1980); Kenneth W. Starr, The Courts of Appeals and the Future of the
Federal Judiciary, 1991 Wis. L REv. 1, 7.
rangement seems to promise a marked increase of in-chambers produc-
tivity.
Technology: Perhaps the greatest advances in the courts of appeals
over the last two decades have been in the area of technology. A few
highlights are illustrative: records, briefs, and other documents are rou-
tinely filed electronically;' fully-automated appellate case-management
plans rely on advanced software programs;87 electronic networks link
judges' chambers, the clerk's office, and staff attorneys. Perhaps the
most pronounced change in appellate technology has been the growing
presence of the courts of appeals on the World Wide Web of the
Internet. Internet home pages have revolutionized how judges and law-
yers interact on appeal, including virtual oral arguments, e-mail linkages
for briefing, instantaneous publishing and downloading of decisions, and
the like.'
Under the joint auspices of the Federal Judicial Center and the Admin-
istrative Office of United States Courts, a prototype software program,
nicknamed "Judge Dread," has been developed to provide computer as-
sistance to human judges deciding cases.' These protocols will allow
each side to access a hyper-text-mark-up-language form at a court's home
page and to keyboard answers to sets of questions arranged in series,
each set of questions being generated by the answers to the previous set
of questions, until the program reaches a recommended outcome (to
affirm or reverse the District Court) based on a computer-generated
rationale which will be communicated directly to the parties and to the
three judges assigned the appeal. Then the parties may electronically file
their responses to the computer recommendation with the human judges.
Of course, the actual judging in these appeals will still be performed,
ultimately, by the human judges. A pilot program will be conducted by
the Rand Corporation, beginning at the end of this year, in which ran-
domly selected appeals will be decided by both existing appellate proce-
86. See FED. R. App. P. 26(a)(2)(D). We have come a long way since the first primi-
tive, interactive cyberbrief was filed in the Supreme Court back in 1997. That amicus
curiae CD-ROM, ironically enough, was filed in a case dealing with government censor-
ship on the Internet Reno v. ACLU, _ S. Ct. __ (1997) (No. 96-511). See generally
Shannon P. Duffy, "Cyberbrief' Shows Web's Workings, LEGAL INTELLGENCER, Feb. 21,
1997, at 1.
87. See BAKER, supra note 52, at 153.
88. See generally Federal Courts' Home Page (visited Feb. 21, 1997)
<http://www.uscourts.gov>; The Federal Judicial Center Home Page (visited Feb. 21,
1997) <httpJ/www.t0c.gov>; U.S. Federal Courts Finder (visited Feb. 21, 1997)
<http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDCTS>.
89. See Isaac Assimov, The Next 70 Years for Law and Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 57, 58
(1985); BAKER, supra note 52, at 153.
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dures and by using the Judge Dread courtware to allow for a comparison
for consistency in outcomes.
State-of-the-Appellate-Art Innovations: The visionary judges of the
United States Courts of Appeals have reimagined their courts in the
twenty-first century. Federal appellate procedures have evolved and pro-
gressed far beyond their nineteenth century origin in the Evarts Act.'
New traditions have replaced old traditions."' Our appellate ideals better
reflect the modem appellate reality.' We have rid ourselves of illusions
like the oral argument and the written opinion.' We look into the future
with our eyes wide open, prepared for the worst but prepared to do our
best.
Those of us charged with the responsibility to administer the federal
courts must anticipate future problems and prepare to solve them
now.94 We have experienced exponential increases in federal appellate
caseloads since 2000, and predictions for the coming decades of the 30s
and 40s create a sense of urgency that our federal appellate procedures
should be radically refashioned to allow the courts of appeals to decide
more appeals more expeditiously. The statutory right' of an appeal
must be preserved at all cost.9'
It is a truism that the courts of appeals differ in their regional experi-
ences, that they are separate and individual judicial institutions.97 But I
want to highlight two spectacular innovations which have been success-
90. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See generally BAKER, supra note 52,
at 9-11.
91. BAKER, supra note 52, at 21-26, 181-85.
92. Id. at 27-30.
93. "In far too many appeals being decided by the Courts of Appeals today, what
remains of the federal appellate tradition and ideal resembles Alice's Cheshire Cat, only
the smile is left and it is growing fainter and fainter." Id. at 184.
94. "'he history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created
by the preceding generation's procedural reforms." Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals,
70 CORNE L L REV. 603, 624 (1985).
95. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1994).
96. See BAKER, supra note 52, at 149-50.
The cumulative impact of decision maling shortcuts has imposed costs above
and beyond the disadvantages of each individual procedure. As a result of
the reforms, the circuit courts have lost their role as appellate courts and
have become certiorari courts. Further, the changes in the decision maldng
process have diminished the quality of the courts' work, a degradation which
has had the greatest effect upon the poorest and least powerful litigants.
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 69, at 293.
97. BAKER, supra note 52, at 106-07.
fully implemented by two different courts of appeals. My purpose is not
to endorse these particulars, though I find them creative and original.
Instead, my avowed purpose is to endorse the general attitude of experi-
mentation and invention displayed by these two courts of appeals.
The United States Court of Appeals for Las Vegas has taken the
nonargument calendar and the decision-without-opinion reforms to the
next level. The judges have established the Coin-Toss Calendar. Appeals
are screened onto this calendar if they satisfy several related criteria. If
an appeal presents issues that are unimportant and uninteresting to the
judges and it appears that determining the correct outcome will take too
much time, considering what is at stake for the party-litigants, the case is
scheduled for an appellate appearance before an appellate magistrate.'
At the appellate appearance, the lawyers are permitted to examine a coin
specially cast with the Seal of the Court on each side, clearly labelled
"Affirmed" on one side and "Reversed" on the other. The immediate re-
sult is announced to the parties and officially recorded and eventually
published in a table in the case reporter.99
The delegation to the appellate magistrate obviously saves valuable
circuit judge time. There can be no complaint about delegation to law
clerks. Time otherwise wasted reading the briefs, studying the record,
and researching law in the coin-toss appeals can be put to better uses.
Finally, the Coin-Toss Calendar formalizes and legitimizes a practice that
court observers time-out-of-mind have attributed to judges.
The United States Court of Appeals for Atlantic City has developed an
ingenious procedure to deal with wholesale categories of appeals which
it calls "Scratch-an-Appeal." The procedure is based on an historical re-
gression analysis of past decisions in appeals dealing with social security,
prisoner civil rights, and habeas corpus. That statistical analysis revealed
a relatively low percentage of reversals in those categories that did not
correlate sufficiently with any fact pattern or principle of law. In short,
the distribution of outcomes more resembled random Jungian black-box
decisions.
The circuit judges rightly deemed it far too inefficient and wasteful to
go on searching for needles in those haystacks of appeals on a case-by-
case basis. Consequently, the clerk of the court entered into an agree-
ment with the same company that provides "scratch-off" game cards for
the New Jersey state lottery to have "Scratch-an-Appeal" cards printed up
for the court's use, under a security arrangement similar to the state's
lottery. The cards bear the legend "United States Court of Appeals for
98. See id. at 175-76.
99. Cf. id. at 121-23 (describing the "anathema" practice of deciding appeals without
opinions).
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Atlantic City Scratch-an-Appeal." The cards are very tastefully designed
with a high-quality, full color graphic of the blindfolded figure of Justice
holding a set of scales. Full color printing and scanning techniques elimi-
nate any risk of tampering or counterfeiting.
When an appeal is presented in one of the designated categories, the
court clerk takes the next card from a secure dispenser and stamps it
with a docket number and then mails it to the appellant. On the reverse
side of the card appear instructions on how to use a key or a coin to
scratch away the scales of justice to reveal the outcome of the numbered
appeal, "Affirmed" or "Reversed." If "Affirmed" appears on the card, noth-
ing else is required of the litigants. If "Reversed" appears, the appellant is
requested to redeem the card for an official form mandate to be entered
on the appellate record. The court already is contemplating expanding
the "Scratch-an-Appeal" program to develop a separate card for all cases
with pro se appellants, whose litigation proclivities somewhat mirror a
compulsive gambler."
Appellate procedures thus have been brought into line with the reali-
ties of the appellate predicament, and this novel judicial process reflects
the larger culture. The key to the success of this program is that the
court established the reversal rate at ten percent, which is higher than
the old-fashioned decisions by judges and better odds than one gets in
comparable state lottery scratch-off games."' The "Scratch-an-Appeal"
is very popular with many litigants, who understand their chances for
success otherwise are rare to nonexistent and who prefer random out-
comes to expensive appeals and long delays.
These are just two examples of procedural innovations that deserve to
be implemented widely in the courts of appeals. We must remind our-
selves that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. 2 Rather, bring-
100. Cf. Adam Geller, That's the Ticket-Instant Game Card Printer Making a Mint,
45 REC. N. NJ., Aug. 13, 1995, at BI; James Walsh, Why Do People Play the Lottery?,
CONSUMER RES. MAG., Mar. 1, 1996, at 22.
101. See Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Federalism in the United States,
46 S.C. L REV. 835, 872 (1995).
It is worth noting that the federal [habeas corpus] jurisdiction has a certain
'needle in the haystack' quality: "[C]omprehensive statistics are lacldng, but
those that are available indicate that the writ is granted in at most 4 percent
of the cases in which it is sought, and in many of these cases it is possible
for the state to retry the prisoner."
Id. (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURm 366-67 (5th ed. 1994)).
102. BAKER, supra note 52, at 236 (referring to "venerable Supreme Court dictum" to
this effect).
ing an appeal is a matter of governmental grace, first legislative and then
judicial. Furthermore, if the Constitution is not offended by tossing a
coin to impeach and remove a judge with Article Ill tenure, then surely a
federal judge can toss a coin to decide an appeal."°
These two state-of-the-appellate-art innovations promise enormous
savings of ever-becoming-more-scarce judicial resources. Unfortunately,
documented projections of federal appellate docket growth for the next
two decades will resemble "The Blob" and will consume these savings
and more.
Adding Judges: It only stands to reason, unless demand somehow is
decreased, that the most logical alternative for dealing with growing
federal appellate dockets is to increase the supply of judgepower. Tradi-
tionally, creating new circuit judgeships was the domain of the political
branches.
In 1990, there were 156 circuit judgeships, even though the caseload
would have justified 206 under the Judicial Conference standards." 4
For most of the history of the courts of appeals, circuit judgeships have
been delivered in larger and larger litters."° Omnibus bills traditionally
were the captives of divided government, however. When the White
House and the Congress were in the hands of different parties, no judge-
ships were forthcoming. 6
It was a judicial miracle, then, that occurred in 2000, after a sea-
change election by which the White House and the Congress came under
control of the same party, when Congress passed and the President
signed the Circuit Judgeship Parity Act," 7 Veteran court reformers still
marvel at this far-reaching legislation. Authority to create circuit judge-
ships was delegated to the Judicial Conference under a docket-based for-
mula, subject to being modified only by legislation if enacted before the
new position is filled." We in the judicial branch ceased our resistance
to the most obvious and indeed necessary solution to appellate case-
103. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253-54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
104. REPOwr OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 48, at 114. By
1992, the total was 179 judgeships, though some positions were unfilled, and the Ad-
ministrative Office formula would have justified 277. Richman & Reynolds, supra note
69, at 297-98 & n.126.
105. BAKER, supra note 52, at 201, 212.
106. DEBORAH J. BARRow E7 AL, THE FDERAL JUDICIARY AND INSTITUrONAL CHANGE
75-76 (1996); John M. De Flueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Expansion of the Federal Judi-
ciary, 39 J.L & ECON. 435, 459-60 (1996).
107. Pub. L No. 106-123, 104 Stat. 456 (2000).
108. The bill was based on CARL BARR, JUDGESHIP CREATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
OPTIONS FOR REFORM (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1981); see also BAKER, supra note 52, at 207-09.
[Vol 24: 859, 1997] 2020 Year-End Report on the Judiciary
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
load."° The impact from this legislation on the courts of appeals has.
been profound. Maintaining a parity between caseload and judgeships,
the number of authorized positions immediately increased to 577 judge-
ships in the year of passage, and the total has roughly doubled every ten
years to the present full complement of 2000 circuit judges."' Despite
this decennial doubling, caseload demand continues to outstrip judgeship
supply, though the courts of appeals are staying current. And we have
exorcised the specter of judicial gridlock while maintaining our grand
tradition of generalized courts."'
Adding these large cohorts of judges to the courts of appeals has not
been without untoward effects. The old en banc rehearings became im-
possible and had to be abolished."' The judicial branch budget has
grown exponentially to cover the costs of additional judgeships, cham-
bers expenses, and support staff."' The days of the once-elite federal
bench are gone forever, with federal judges outnumbering administrative
law judges in the Social Security Administration."4 Quality of judging
has not suffered, at least in part because there are so many able lawyers
in the United States."' Increased instability in the law of the circuit has
resulted in increased rates of appeals, thus fueling larger increases in the
109. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 69, at 297-339.
110. "In 1975, one federal jurisdiction seer predicted that in the twenty-first century
5,000 circuit judges would be filling 1,000 volumes of Federal Reporter, umpteenth
series, disposing of approximately a million appeals--each and every year." BAKER, su-
pra note 52, at 212 (citing John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L
REV. 567, 567 (1975)).
111. "Since concern with caseload is most acute in the courts of appeals, the idea of
specialized federal courts of appeals deserves careful consideration." POSNER, supra
note 66, at 244; see Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vi-
sion to Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A
Preliminary Blueprint for Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establish-
ing a Separate System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WNL & MARY L REV. 535
(1996).
112. BAKER, supra note 52, at 155-58, 202.
113. Id. at 203.
114. TiE AL HANDBOOK, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO BECOMING A FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw JUDGE 62 (2d ed. 1994). The SSA was once labeled "the Mount Everest of bureau-
crati structures ... with ... the largest system of administrative adjudication in the
western world." Jon C. Dubin, Social Security Law, 26 TEx. TECH L REV. 763, 764
(1995).
115. Comparing the linear rates of average growth in the American population with
the recent trends in the number of lawyers, "by the year 2074 every man, woman, and
child in the United States will be a lawyer." JOHN SUBER, STRAIGHT SHOOTING: WHAT'S
WRONG WrrH AMERICA AND How TO FiX IT 213 (1989).
docket in a closed system of mega-crisis."' More intangible specula-
tions have been expressed, along the way, that so large a number of
circuit judgeships lessens the authoritativeness of the courts of appeals,
renders virtually impossible synthesis and critique of the law, and disad-
vantages litigants who lack the resources to keep up with the law. "7
But, thankfully, pragmatism has won out."'
Splitting Circuits: The chief consequence of adding so many circuit
judges for the structure of the intermediate federal courts has been the
splitting-more descriptively, the fracturing-of the structure of the re-
gional courts of appeals. The nineteenth century geographical organiza-
tion has been obliterated.
The 1981 division of the old Fifth Circuit to create the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, some twenty years in the making, was a harbinger of things to
come."9 The old court suffered from such diseconomies of scale in
terms of geography, population, docket, and number of judges that Con-
gress was moved to divide it in two."2
When Congress enacted the above-mentioned Circuit Judgeship Parity
Act of 2000, circuit splitting achieved a critical mass. The immediate
doubling increase to 577 judgeships that year provided Congress with a
compelling reason to redraw the circuit boundaries. 2' The old Ninth
Circuit was divided immediately to create the Twelfth Circuit." When
no court wanted to be named the Thirteenth Circuit out of judicial tris-
kaidekaphobia, Congress established a legislative precedent of renaming
the circuits after their headquarters city." Thus, the "United States
116. BAKER, supra note 52, at 206-07.
117. See Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U.
L REv. 29, 38-40 (1990).
118. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 69, at 339-40.
119. BAKER, supra note 52, at 52-73.
120. Id. at 65-66.
121. We have not recommended a general realignment of all the circuits.
To be sure, the present boundaries are largely the result of histori-
cal accident and do not satisfy such criteria as parity of caseloads
and geographical compactness. But these boundaries have stood
since the nineteenth century . . . and whatever the actual extent of
variation in the law from circuit to circuit, relocation would take
from the bench and bar at least some of the law now familiar to
them. Moreover, the Commission has heard eloquent testimony evi-
dencing the sense of community shared by lawyers and judges
within the present circuits. Except for the most compelling reasons,
we are reluctant to disturb institutions which have acquired not
only the respect but also the loyalty of their constituents.
Geographical Boundaries, supra note 42, at 228.
122. BAKER, supra note 52, at 74-105 (arguing for a postponement of proposals to
divide the Ninth Circuit). See generaly Symposium, The Proposal to Split the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 57 MoNT. L. REv. 241 (1996).
123. "[Alre we to continue the splitting process until it becomes mincing, with a Unit-
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Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit" was renamed the "United States
Court of Appeals for New Orleans." 24 This new naming scheme later
proved prescient when the division of California into multiple circuits
established the legitimacy of subdividing one state into more than one
circuit.28 The process of congressional circuit splitting proceeded, as if
following some law of physics, until we reached today's relatively stable
configuration of 154 separate courts of appeals with 2000 Circuit Judg-
es.
126
The de facto criteria for splitting a circuit that have emerged over time
were summarized by the Baker Commission: (1) a circuit should be com-
posed of at least three zip codes; (2) no circuit should be created that
will not require at least nine judges; (3) a circuit should contain neigh-
borhoods with a diversity of population, legal business, and socioeco-
nomic interests; (4) realignment should not depend on preexisting align-
ments; and (5) a circuit should be as contiguous as is possible." Chief
Judge Baker of the Court of Appeals for Lubbock, the Chairman of the
Commission, wryly observed, "After all, these are not congressional dis-
tricts."'
28
The benefits of circuit splitting have not been purchased without a
price. Uniformity in the national law has been lessened by the prevalence
and persistence of conflicts among the circuits, now multiplied many
ed States Court of Appeals for the Houston Metropolitan Area?" Thomas Gibbs Gee,
The Imminent Destruction of the FfUU Circuit Or, How Not to Deal with a Blossom-
ing Docket, 9 TEx TECH L REv. 799, 806 (1978).
124. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2680, 62 Stat. 869-870, 984-985 (Judicial
Code provision officially renaming circuit courts of appeals as the "United States Court
of Appeals for the [number] Circuit").
125. Cf. Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal
Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L REV. 1188 (1974).
126. In 1990, 156 judges sat on 12 regional courts. See supra note 104 and accompa-
nying text. In 2020, 2000 judges sat on x regional courts (156/12 = 2000/x and x -
154).
127. In 1973, the Hruska Commission settled on criteria suitable to a different era:
(1) circuits should be composed of at least three states: (2) no circuit should
be created that would immediately require more than nine judges; (3) a cir-
cuit should contain states with a diversity of population, legal business, and
socioeconomic interests; (4) realignment should avoid excessive interference
in established circuit alignment; and (5) no circuit should contain noncontig-
uous states.
BAKER, srupra note 52, at 56.
128. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1965-67 (1996) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion
appendices A-C).
times." Now, the Supreme Court applies the rule that a conflict is not
ripe for review until at least 75 circuits, or roughly half the 154, have
ruled on the issue. Thus conflicts percolate over great time and small
distances."8 The "federalizing function" of the courts of appeals has
been lost..3 And, of course, splitting a circuit does not do anything to
alleviate workload. This is because a circuit's caseload manifests the dis-
tributive property from mathematics: simply dividing a court of appeals
does not result in fewer appeals or in fewer appeals per judge." But
for anyone to object to this reform at this date in our judicial history
would be splitting into the wind.
Evolved Courts of Appeals: The courts of appeals have come a long
way since their creation nearly a century and a half ago. But their essen-
tial function as the intermediate appellate court between the district
courts and the Supreme Court has been preserved." Ignore the institu-
tional changes in the numbers of circuits and the number of judges. What
does it matter if it takes 2000 judges today to decide 400,000 appeals?
What is important, what is essential, is that the appeals are being termi-
nated and that the courts of appeals remain current in their docket
We have arrived at the modem appellate wisdom that it is more impor-
tant that an appeal be decided than that it be decided rightly."3
Therefore, how the courts of appeals go about deciding appeals simply
does not matter. Appellate procedures are merely means towards a great-
er end. Ineffective procedures, procedures that place demands on scarce
judicial resources, procedures like oral arguments and written opinions,
must be discarded. Innovations like the Coin-Toss Calendar and the
Scratch-an-Appeal demonstrate judicial ingenuity and a commitment to
the greater end of the termination of appeals. The ultimate measure of
appellate procedures is how much they contribute to the mission of the
courts of appeals." That mission is to decide appeals, not to create
works of art.131
129. BAKER, supra note 52, at 17-21.
130. "The framers of the Constitution and the drafters of federal statutes did not
intend that our national law have 'more variations than we have time zones.'" Thomas
E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L
REv. 1400, 1408 (1987) (quoting Warren E. Burger, 1985 Year-End Report on the Judi-
ciary 13).
131. John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L REv. 787 (1980).
132. BAKER, supra note 52, at 72-73.
133. Id. at 231.
134. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."
Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. BAKER, supra note 52, at 27-29.
136. See Thomas E. Baker, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Long-Range Planning for
the Federal Judiciary, 23 TFx TECH L Rev. 1, 2-5 (1992) (discussing the mission of
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What is important, what is essential, is that the appeal-as-of-right has
been preserved in the face of long-term docket growth that for more
than half a century has threatened the function and survival of the courts
of appeals. It is a testimony to the circuit judges that their industry and
their innovation have allowed them to manage their dockets."3 There is
no more resilient an institution to be found in the federal government
than the United States Courts of Appeals. Our circuit judges deserve our
respect and admiration and our gratitude for their efforts to perfect ap-
pellate justice."
V. A PERSONAL PoTCRIPr
President Carter will have the constitutional duty to nominate my suc-
cessor, who will become the eighteenth Chief Justice." This is most
appropriate given the fact that her father was the only President to serve
a full term without appointing a member of the Supreme Court. May she
choose wisely for the good of our Republic.
the federal courts).
I know this is heresy. The idea that the nation will suffer if judges do not
have as much time for each case as they once did is integral to the ideology
of the American legal profession. Indeed, it is entwined with the central
strand of that ideology-the conception of law, in all its aspects including
judging, as a craft of patient artisans. Federal adjudication is further from
this traditional ideal today than it was thirty-five years ago, when judges did
more of their "own worlk" But it is merely an article of faith, with no evi-
dence or even good arguments to back it up, that the consequence of the
"de-artisaning" has had a net deterioration in the average quality of justice
meted out by the federal courts.
POSNER, supra note 66, at 185-86. Ultimately, procedures should be *administered to
secure . . . just [the] speedy[] and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R.
CIv. P. I (edited).
137. Lauren K Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990
BYU L REV. 3, 37-57.
138. See, e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL- COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 303-09
(1994). "What's good for federal judges is good for the court system." CHRISTOPHER E.
SMrrH, JUDICiAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION 126 (1995).
139. Peter G. Fish, The Office of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal
Judiciary's Bicentennial Decade, in THE WrrE BURKETr MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1-153 (1984); John R Vile, The Selection
and Tenure of Chief Justices, 78 JUDICATURE 96 (1994). Just to be contrary, my total
includes one or the other Chief Justice who some others do not count. John Rutledge,
who was nominated but not confirmed, or William Cushing, who was nominated, con-
firmed, and then declined. See What's in a Number?, S. CT. HIST. Soc'y, vol. xvi, no. 2,
at 3 (1996).
In closing, I note that we are about to begin the third decade of this
century. Now is not too soon to begin to build the foundation of a bridge
to the twenty-second century. That was one of President Clinton's favor-
ite metaphors back when he appointed me Chief Justice. I want to con-
clude by expressing my heartfelt thanks to him for providing me this
opportunity for judicial service under the Constitution, made possible in
no small part by his full and unconditional pardon."4 He has been a
wonderful helpmate and life's partner.
We both look forward to our new life together when I take up the
challenge of being Dean at the Pepperdine University School of Law,
retracing the footsteps of my colleague Justice Kenneth W. Starr, who
some years ago left that post to join our Court.
Signed/
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Chief Justice of the United States
140. President Kennedy remarked upon the appointment of his brother Robert F.
Kennedy to be Attorney General: "I see nothing wrong with giving Robert some legal
experience as Attorney General before he goes out to practice law." BILL ADLER, THE
CoMPLErE KENNEDY Wrr 179 (1967).
